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I. INTRODUCTION
Public participation has long been considered an essential element of
effective governance, resolution of broad social problems, and responsible
resource management. The values underlying First Amendment protections
and pluralism demand that individuals and groups have the opportunity to
make their voices heard, without the threat of retaliation by those equipped
with greater financial or institutional power. Executive agencies engage the
public in their regulatory decisions through notice-and-comment processes,'
* J.D., The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, expected 2011; B.A., The
Ohio State University, summa cum laude, 2008; B.S., The Ohio State University, summa
cum laude, 2008.
1 The Administrative Procedure Act, for instance, requires that federal agencies must
provide the public with notice and an opportunity to comment on proposed substantive
rules and regulations before they are finalized. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-553(c) (1994)
("General notice of proposed rulemaking shall be published in the Federal Register ....
After notice required by this section, the agency shall give interested persons an
opportunity to participate in the rulemaking through submission of written data, views, or
arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation.").
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while legislators answer to voters. It is the third branch of government, the
judiciary, that has become the backdrop for financially powerful interests'
attempts to silence groups and individuals who publicly oppose their actions
with the threat of high-stakes litigation. Corporations, developers, and other
private interests use strategic lawsuits against public participation
(SLAPPS) 2-dAefined as suits that "(1) involve communications made to
influence a government action or outcome, (2) which result in civil lawsuits
(complaints, counterclaims, or cross-claims) (3) filed against non-
governmental individuals or groups (4) on a substantive issue of some public
interest or social significance" 3-to intimidate individuals and organizations
that speak out against corporate decisions, development projects, government
actions or operations, or other activities that affect their financial interests. 4
Plaintiffs file SLAPPs not with the intent of recovering from defendants, but
rather to silence individuals and groups that have publicly opposed the
plaintiff's actions or interests with the threat of costly, time-consuming, and
potentially reputation-damaging litigation. 5 The threat of such litigation-
2 The acronym SLAPP was introduced by University of Denver Professors George
W. Pring and Penelope Canan. GEORGE PRING & PENELOPE CAN~AN, SLAPPs: GETTING
SUED FOR SPEAKING OUT (1996).
3 Id at 209.
4~ SLAPPs punish individuals and groups for "reporting violations of law, writing to
government officials, attending public hearings, testifying before government bodies,
circulating petitions for signature, lobbying for legislation, campaigning in initiative or
referendum elections, filing agency protests or appeals, being parties in law-reform
lawsuits, and engaging in peaceful boycotts and demonstrations." George W. Pring,
SLAPPs: Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 7 PACE ENvTL. L. REv. 3, 5
(1989). Certain criminal cases may also fall within the scope of state anti-SLAPP laws.
See Kathleen L. Daerr-Bannon, Cause of Action: Bringing and Defending Anti-SLAPP
Motions to Strike or Dismiss, in 22 CAUSES OF ACTION 2d 317, 323 (Clark Kimball &
Scott Ryan eds., 2003); PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 9. State courts have adopted
varying perspectives on the applicability of their respective state statutes to the reporting
of crimes. Compare Benoit v. Frederickson, 908 N.E.2d 714, 718 (Mass. 2009) ("The
reporting of a rape to police, which initiates the filing of a criminal complaint, is a
petitioning activity encompassed within the protection afforded by [the Massachusetts
anti-SLAPP statute]."), and Wenger v. Aceto, 883 N.E.2d 262, 266 (Mass. 2008)
(holding that the filing of a criminal complaint application qualifies as petitioning activity
for purposes of the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute), with Varela v. Perez, No. CV-08-
2356-PHX-FJM, 2009 WL 4438738, at *1 (D. Ariz. Nov. 30, 2009) ("The crime victim
defendants' report of criminal activity to the police is not a 'petition to the government'
as that term is used in [Arizona's anti-SLAPP statute]. Therefore, the statute has no
application to the present case."). Criminal SLAPPs, though relevant, are beyond the
scope of this Note.
5 See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1024 (9th Cir. 2003) (SLAPPs ."'masquerade
as ordinary lawsuits' but are brought to deter common citizens from exercising their
political or legal rights or to punish them for doing so." (quoting Wilcox v. Superior
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which is generally without merit-has a chilling effect on public
participation and speech and consumes already-strained judicial resources.
As the prevalence of SLAPPs has increased, state legislatures have
turned their attention to preserving their residents' First Amendment rights6
and "protecting citizens from [the] David and Goliath power difference" that
arives SLAPPs.7 In an effort to combat these suits' intimidation effects and
abuse of the judicial process, the legislatures of twenty-seven states 8 and one
territory9 have passed anti-SLAPP statutes)10 Among the state statutes'
common features is the stated purpose of the anti-SLAPP measure. The
Ninth Circuit' Ihas noted that California's anti-SLAPP legislation "was
enacted to allow early dismissal of meritless first amendment cases aimed at
Court, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446, 450 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994))); N. Am. Expositions Co. Ltd.
P'ship v. Corcoran, 898 N.E.2d 831, 835 (Mass. 2009) (describing SLAPPs as "actions
designed not to win, but rather 'to deter or retaliate against individuals who seek to
exercise their right of petition."' (quoting Wenger, 883 N.E.2d at 266)); Fisher v. Lint,
868 N.E.2d 161, 165 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007) ("The purpose of filing a SLAPP suit is not
to prevail in the matter, but rather to use litigation to chill, intimidate, or punish citizens
who have exercised their constitutional right to petition the government to redress a
grievance.").
6 Anti-SLAPP legislation is seen as protecting First Amendment rights, including
free speech, assembly, press, and petition. Daerr-Bannon, supra note 4, at 326. A New
York district court observed that, "[iln recent years, there has been a rising concern about
the use of LSLAPPs] .... In response, New York State enacted a law specifically aimed
at broadening the protections of citizens facing litigation arising from their public
petition and participation." Yeshiva Chofetz Chaim Radin, Inc. v. Vill. of New
Hempstead, 98 F. Supp. 2d 347, 358-59 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
7 Stubom Ltd. P'ship v. Bernstein, 245 F. Supp. 2d 312, 314 (D.,Mass. 2003).
8 These states are Arizona, Arkansas, California, Delaware, Florida, Georgia,
Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, R~hode Island, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, and Washington. For a current
list of states that have passed anti-SLAPP statutes, see CALIFORNIA ANTI-SLAPP
PROJECT, States and Territories with Anti-SLAPP Statutes,
http://www.casp.net/statutes/menstate.html (last visited Nov. 7, 20 10).
9 7 GUAM CODE ANN. § § 17101-17109 (2005).
10 The SLAPP phenomenon is not unique to the United States. See generally SUSAN
LOTTr, CORPORATE RETALIATION AGAINST CONSUMERS: THE STATUS OF STRATEGIC
LAWSUITS AGAINST PUBLIC PARTICIPATION (SLAPPs) IN CANADA (2004); Travis Bover
& Mark Pamell, A Protection of Public Participation Act for South Australia,
http://www.edo.org.au/edosa/research/public%/20participation.htm. (last visited Oct. 10,
2010).
11 The Ninth Circuit is the only circuit in which federal courts apply states' anti-
SLAPP statutes to federal claims; other federal courts treat anti-SLAPP claims as
procedural, rather than substantive, matters.
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*chilling expression through costly, time-consuming litigation."112 Georgia
courts, describing the state's anti-SLAPP law, have also noted the statute's
foundation in First Amendment values,' 3 as have the courts of
Massachusetts,'14 New York,' 5 Rhode Island, 16 Louisiana, 17 and Nevada,' 8
among others. Beyond their shared purpose, these statutes' provisions vary
widely in nature and scope; however, despite their differences, these statutes
all rely on certainty to achieve their purpose. This Note reviews the key
sources of uncertainty in anti-SLAPP law, and suggests that, in order to
12 Metabolife Int'l, Inc. v. Womick, 264 F.3d 832, 839 (9th Cir. 2001). For an in-
depth discussion of the purpose of California's anti-SLAPP law, see Wilcox v. Superior
Court, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446, 449-50 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
13 The court explained:
The General Assembly enacted the anti-SLAPP statute to encourage Georgians to
participate in matters of public significance through the exercise of their
constitutional rights of freedom of speech and the right to petition government for
redress of grievances. . . . The coverage of the anti-SLAPP statute extends to
'abusive litigation that seeks to chill exercise of certain First Amendment rights'
based upon defamation, invasion of privacy, breach of contract, and intentional
interference with contractual rights and opportunities arising from speech and
petition of government.
EarthResources, LLC v. Morgan Cnity., 638 S.E.2d 325, 329 (Ga. 2006) (quoting Browns
Mill Dev. Co. v. Denton, 543 S.E.2d 65, 68 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000)).
14 The Massachusetts anti-SLAPP law "is intended to protect the 'exercise of the
constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances."' N.
Am. Expositions Co. Ltd. P'ship v. Corcoran, 898 N.E.2d 831, 853 (Mass. 2009)
(quoting Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Prods. Corp., 691 N.E.2d 935, 939 (Mass. 1998)).
15 See Yeshiva Chofetz, Chaim Radin, Inc. v. Vill. of New Hempstead, 98 F. Supp.
2d 347, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("The clearly expressed intent of the legislature was to
safeguard the free exercise of speech, petition and association rights .. . against those
who would try to interfere with a citizen's constitutional rights." (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
16 See Alves v. Hometown Newspapers, Inc., 857 A.2d 743, 752 (R.I. 2004)
(explaining that the state's "anti-SLAPP statute was enacted to prevent vexatious lawsuits
against citizens who exercise their First Amendment rights of free speech and legitimate
petitioning by granting those activities conditional immunity from punitive civil
claims.").
17 In enacting the state's anti-SLAPP statute, "[tlhe Louisiana legislature's intent
[was] to prevent the abuse of the legal system by providing a procedural mechanism to
dispense with meritless suits that have the purpose of chilling one's freedom of speech."
Lee v. Pennington, 830 So. 2d 1037, 1042-43 (La. Ct. App. 2002).
18 See John v. Douglas Cnity. Sch. Dist., 219 P.3d 1276, 1282 (Nev. 2009)
("Nevada's anti-SLAPP statute filters unmeritorious claims in an effort to protect citizens
from costly retaliatory lawsuits arising from their right to free speech under both the
Nevada and Federal Constitutions.").
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combat that uncertainty, anti-SLAPP statutes make explicit their applicability
to specific individuals, activities, and subject matter.
11. SOURCES OF UNCERTAINTY IN ANTI-SLAPP LAW
The wide variation among the protection afforded litigants by existing
state anti-SLAPP statutes and the absence of anti-SLAPP legislation in many
jurisdictions are inconsistent with the certainty essential to the effective
deterrence of SLAPPs.19 If individuals and groups are unsure whether their
petitioning activities will be protected by an anti-SLAPP measure, its ability
to mitigate the suits' chilling effect on public participation will be negligible.
The absence of federal anti-SLAPP law compounds the problem of
uncertainty associated with the availability of anti-SLAPP immunity, and
until federal anti-SLAPP legislation is adopted, state legislatures will be left
to respond to the central causes of uncertainty associated with anti-SLAPP
law-availability, validity, applicability, and appealability.20
A. Availability
The absence of anti-SLAPP legislation in a forum not only deprives its
citizens of protection from frivolous and abusive litigation, but also-and
perhaps more significantly-adds to the problem of uncertainty among
litigants which arises from the states' fragmented approach to anti-SLAPP
protection. This is best illustrated by the operation of state anti-SLAPP laws
in federal diversity cases, as well as the treatment of purported SLAPPs in
jurisdictions, both state and federal, without statutory measures in place.
1. The Federal Forum
The certainty with which litigants view anti-SLAPP protections is further
diminished by the division among federal courts with respect to their
willingness to apply state anti-SLAPP Jaw.21 Courts have generally treated
19 See Containment Techs. Grp., Inc. v. Am. Soc'y of Health Sys. Pharmacists, No.
1:07-cv-0997-DFH-TAB, 2009 WL 838549, at *6 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 26, 2009) ("The
parties' dispute over choice of law is based primarily on the differences between the
Indiana and Maryland anti-SLAPP statutes.").
2 0 Brooke Goldstein & Aaron Eitan Meyer, "Legal Jihad": How Islamist Lawfare
Tactics Are Targeting Free Speech, 15 ILSA J. INT'L & ComIP. L. 395, 398-99 ("The
problem ... with Anti-SLAPP statutes is threefold-not all states have enacted them,
there is no federal equivalent, and one must wait to be sued in order to take advantage of
them.").
21 For discussion of the variation among courts' Erie analyses involving state anti-
SLAPP statutes and a proposed analytical solution, see John A. Lynch, Jr., Federal
20101 849
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the operation of state anti-SLAPP statutes as procedural rather than
substantive and, accordingly, have declined to apply the statutes in federal
actions.22 The Massachusetts district court, for instance, indicated a conflict
between the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP law and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure,23 and Maine's district court, upon reviewing the Maine anti-
SLAPP statute, echoed this conclusion. 24 The Ninth Circuit, in contrast, has
allowed defendants in federal diversity actions involving state claims to
invoke the California and Oregon anti-SLAPP statutes,25 and federal district
courts in Georgia, 26 Indiana,27 and Utah28 have followed, applying their
Procedure and Erie: Saving State Litigation Reform Through Comparative Impairment,
30 WHiTrIER L. REV. 283, 316-27 (2008).
22 Daerr-Bannon, supra note 4, at 330.
23 Stuborn Ltd. P'ship. v. Bernstein, 245 F. Supp. 2d 312, 316 (D. Mass. 2003)
(declining to apply the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute because "[its] special motion
provision is predominantly procedural in nature, and . . . it directly conflicts with the
Federal Rules of Procedure."); Baker v. Coxe, 940 F. Supp. 409, 417 (D. Mass. 1996)
("[T]his Court will examine the allegations of the complaint under the well-worn
standards governing Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motions, not the hybrid statutory procedure in
section 59H which is more akin to a summary judgment motion."); see also Godin v.
School Union 134, Civ. No. 09-77-B-W, 2009 WL 1686910, at *4 (D. Me. June 16,
2009) ("[T]he district courts in Massachusetts are in consensus that [Massachusetts's
anti-SLAPP statute] is procedural and that special motions to dismiss are not permissible
in federal litigation.").
24 Godin, 2009 WL 1686910, at *5 ("Following the consensus of the Massachusetts
District Court .. . I conclude that the manner that the Maine anti-SLAPP statute
contemplates these special motions being presented with competing declarations and a
shifting burden conflicts with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing motions to
dismiss and motions for summary judgment.").
25 See Thomas v. Fry's Elec., Inc., 400 F.3d 1206, 1206-07 (9th Cir. 2005)
(reaffirming Lockheed's holding that the motion to strike and fee provisions of
California's anti-SLAPP statute are available to litigants in federal court, but
acknowledging that heightened pleading standards may not be imposed in federal
forums); United States v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963, 972-73 (9th
Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1203 (2000) (holding that California's anti-SLAPP
procedure does not conflict with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8, 12, and 56 and may
be applied in federal court); see also Gardner v. Martino, 563 F.3d 981, 991 (9th Cir.
2009) (holding that the Oregon anti-SLAPP statute's requirement that offending claims
be dismissed without prejudice does not conflict with Federal Rule 15(a)); Verizon Del.,
Inc. v. Covad Commc'ns Co., 377 F.3d 1081, 1091 (9th Cir. 2004) ("If the offending
claims remain in the first amended complaint, the anti-SLAPP remedies remain available
to defendants."); Card v. Pipes, 398 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1136-37 (D. Or. 2004) (following
the Ninth Circuit and applying Oregon's anti-SLAPP procedure in a diversity case).
26 See, e.g., Buckley v. DirecTV, Inc., 276 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1275 n.5 (N.D. Ga.
2003) (following the Ninth Circuit and concluding that the Georgia anti-SLAPP statute is
available to litigants in federal court). But see Adventure Outdoors, Inc. v. Bloomberg,
519 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1278 (N.D. Ga. 2007) ("[T]he court will not apply the procedural
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respective states' anti-SLAPP laws.29 It is not yet clear whether the Ninth
Circuit would apply state anti-SLAPP statutes to federal question cases,
although existing authority suggests that it would not.30 A number of other
federal courts have explicitly declined to hear anti-SLAPP motions made
pursuant to state statutes in federal question cases,3 1 while certain state courts
aspects of Georgia's anti-SLAPP statute to this litigation, and the court finds that any
failure of Plaintiffs to 'verify' their complaint under the requirements of [Georgia's anti-
SLAPP statute] is not grounds for dismissal in federal court.") (emphasis added).
27 See Containment Techns. Grp., Inc. v. Am. Soc'y of Health Sys. Pharmacists, No.
1 :07-cv-0997-DFH-TAB, 2009 WL 838549, at *8 (S.D. hid. Mar. 26, 2009) (refuiting the
assertion that the Indiana anti-SLAPP statute conflicted with Federal Rule 56 and was,
accordingly, inapplicable: "[T]he anti-SLAPP statute has a distinctly substantive
flavor.... [It] provides a complete defense to defamation and also provides the remedy
of attorney fees to a victorious defendant. These are substantive provisions of Indiana law
that govern in this diversity jurisdiction case."). But cf. Nixon v. Haag, No. 1 :08-cv-
00648-LJM-JMS, 2009 WL 2026343, at *3 (S.D. Ind. July 7, 2009) ("[T]he [Indiana]
Anti-SLAPP Act's statutory stay of discovery conflicts with [Rule 26 of] the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.").
28 USANA Health Scis., Inc. v. Minkow, No. 2:07-cv- 159 TC, 2008 WL 619287, at
*2 (D. Utah Mar. 4, 2008) (applying the California anti-SLAPP statute in a federal
diversity case, reasoning that the statute did not conflict with the Federal Rules and that
its application would support "significant state interests furthered by the anti-SLAPP
statutes" without threatening any federal interests).
29 Federal courts outside of California have also followed the Ninth Circuit in
applying California's anti-SLAPP law in federal court. See, e.g., Price v. Stossel, No. 07
Cv. 11 364(SWKX), 2008 WL 2434137, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2008) ("The Court follows
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which has concluded that the motion-to-strike
provision of the California Anti-SLAPP Statute is substantive, and thus applicable to a
federal court sitting in diversity.").
30 See In re Bah, 321 B.R. 41, 46, 47 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005) (noting that "[w~hile the
Ninth Circuit has held that the anti-SLAPP statute applies in diversity actions . . . it has
not decided whether it applies in cases involving federal question jurisdiction and holding
that "the anti-SLAPP statute is inapplicable to federal claims").
31 See South Middlesex Opportunity Council, Inc. v. Town of Framingham, Civ. No.
07-12018-DPW, 2008 WL 4595369, at *9 (D. Mass. Sept. 30, 2008); Kearney v. Foley &
Lardner, 553 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1183 (S.D. Cal. 2008) ("Where a complaint contains both
anti-SLAPP and non-anti-SLAPP causes of action, e.g., federal claims, the SLAPP claims
alone may be stricken and a motion to dismiss may be directed to the non-SLAPP causes
of action."); Summit Media LLC v. City of L.A., Cal., 530 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1094 (C.D.
Cal. 2008) ("[T]he [state] anti-SLAPP statute does not apply to federal question claims in
federal court because such application would frustrate substantive federal rights.");
Yeshiva Chofetz Chaim Radin, Inc. v. Vill. of New Hempstead, 98 F. Supp. 2d 347, 360
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that the New York anti-SLAPP statute does not apply in
federal question cases); Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Grp., Inc., 63 F.
Supp. 2d 1127, 1130 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (Defendant's argument "that the anti-SLAPP
statute should be applied to federal question claims . . . is not supported by the Erie
rationale articulated in the Lockheed decision or by any other authority of which the
2010] 851
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have allowed anti-SLAPP motions to proceed where federal claims are heard
in state court. The Nevada Supreme Court, for instance, has concluded that
the state's anti-SLAPP statute applies to federal claims "because it is a
neutral and procedural statute that. does not undermine any federal
interests."132
Those federal courts which have applied state anti-SLAPP statutes have
noted the importance of reconciling the laws with applicable Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.33 The Ninth Circuit, for instance, has applied California's
state anti-SLAPP language governing the availability of the special motion
and the award of attorney's fees,34 but has rejected the statute's "discovery-
limiting aspects"35 and amendment restrictions36 as inconsistent with the
Federal Rules. Following similar reasoning, a Georgia district court, rejecting
its own precedent,37 declined to apply the state's anti-SLAPP law in a
Court is aware. Consequently, the Court concludes that the anti-SLAPP statute is not
applicable to the federal claims . . . .)
32 John v. Douglas Cnity. Sch. Dist., 219 P.3d 1276, 1279 (Nev. 2009).
33 See, e.g., Am. Nat'l Red Cross v. United Way Cal. Capital Region, No. CIV. S-
07-1236 WBS DAD, 2008 WL 2302188, at *3 (E.D. Cal. May 30, 2008) (citing Vess v.
Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1109 (9th Cir. 2003)) ("While [m]otions to strike
a state law claim under California's anti-SLAPP statute may be brought in federal court,
the Erie doctrine dictates which of the statute's subdivisions apply in federal court."
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
34 See United States ex rel. Newsham. v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d
963, 972 (9th Cur. 1999).
35 Metabolife Int'l, Inc. v. Wornick, 264 F.3d 832, 846 (9th Cir. 2001). A California
court, discussing the "[s]pecial procedural rules [that] apply where an anti-SLAPP motion
is brought in federal court," explained that the court should treat an anti-SLAPP motion
arising from a plaintiff's failure to provide evidence to support its claim as a motion for
summary judgment. Lauter v. Anoufrieva, 642 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1109 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
Summary judgment will be unavailable in such circumstances unless the plaintiff has had
a sufficient opportunity to conduct discovery; to allow a defendant to demand that a
plaintiff present evidence prior to discovery would he inconsistent with Federal Rule 56.
Id.; see also Containment Techs. Grp., Inc. v. Am. Soc'y of Health Sys. Pharmacists, No.
1 :07-cv-0997-DFH-TAB, 2009 WL 83 8549, at *8 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 26, 2009) ("The court
applies both Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the substantive portions
of the Indiana Anti-SLAPP statute. .. .)
36 Verizon Del., Inc. v. Covad Commc'ns Co., 377 F.3d 1081, 1091 (9th Cir. 2004)
("[Giranting a defendant's anti-SLAPP motion to strike a plaintiffs initial complaint
without granting the plaintiff leave to amend would directly collide with Fed. R. Civ. P.
1 5(a)'s policy favoring liberal amendment.").
3 7 Adventure Outdoors, Inc. v. Bloomberg, 519 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1278 n.8 (N.D.
Ga. 2007) ("The court is aware that in Buckley v. DIRECTV Inc., 276 F. Supp. 2d 1271,
1275 n.5 (N.D. Ga. 2003) .. . the court, applying the Ninth Circuit precedent, found that
there was no Erie conflict between the Federal Rules and the procedural aspects of
Georgia's anti-SLAPP statute. ... The court disagrees with [this] analysis ... 1.
852 Vol. 71:4
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diversity case, concluding that the statute's heightened pleading requirements
for plaintiffs conflict with Federal Rule 8(a), and refused to dismiss
plaintiffs' claims despite their failure to verify the complaint, as required by
the state statute.38
Disparate judicial interpretations of anti-SLAPP laws and their
applicability in federal forums further exacerbate the problem of uncertainty
arising from inconsistencies among various jurisdictions' anti-SLAPP
remedies. The efficacy of anti-SLAPP measures in achieving their purpose
depends largely upon the certainty with which citizens view the laws'
protections; the enactment of an anti-SLAPP statute will do little to mitigate
the chilling of public participation associated with the risk of SLAPPs unless
those who would otherwise be silenced are sufficiently confident that, in the
case of retaliatory lawsuits, they will be able to avoid burdensome litigation.
While uniformity among state laws would restrain forum shopping in some
instances, the availability of a federal anti-SLAPP measure would provide
additional deterrence to forum shopping and, more generally, to the filing of
SLAPPs. Although there is presently no federal anti-SLAPP statute, the
problem of SLAPPs has been, if only nominally, placed on Congress's
agenda. The Citizen Participation Act of 200939 was introduced in the U.S.
House of Representatives on December 16, 2009, and has been referred to
the House Committee on the Judiciary. Democratic Congressman Steve
Cohen, who represents Tennessee's Ninth District and authored the state's
anti-SLAPP law, introduced the bill.40 Like state anti-SLAPP statutes, the
bill is designed to reinforce First Amendment protections,41 ensure public
participation in government, 42 promote judicial economy, 43 and protect the
38 See id at 1270.
39 H.R. 4364, 111Ith Cong. (2009) ("To protect [F]irst [A]mendment rights of
petition and free speech by preventing States and the United States from allowing
meritless lawsuits arising from acts in furtherance of those rights, commonly called
"SLAPPs", and for other purposes.").
40 TENN. CODE ANN. § § 4-21-1001-4-21-1004 (LexisNexis 2010).
41 "[T]he framers of our Constitution, recognizing participation in government and
freedom of speech as inalienable rights essential to the survival of democracy, secured
their protection through the First Amendment to the United States Constitution."
H.R. 4364, 111 th Cong. § 2 (2009).
42 "[T]he communications, infonrmation, opinions, reports, testimony, claims and
arguments that individuals, organizations and businesses provide to the government are
essential to wise government decisions and public policy, the public health, safety, and
welfare, effective law enforcement, the efficient operation of government programs ...
and the continuation of America's representative democracy." Id
43 "SLAPPs are an abuse of the judicial process that waste judicial resources and
clog the already over-burdened court dockets." Id
2010] 853
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public from the potentially devastating impacts of SLAPPs.44 The statute's
findings also acknowledge what is perhaps the proposed statute's most
significant goal-to provide uniform protection against SLAPPs. Such
uniformity would not only broaden the scope of anti-SLAPP law by closing
existing gaps in the availability of protection, but also discourage forum
shopping among SLAPP plaintiffs.45
2. Judicial Remedies
In the absence of statutory provisions, state and federal judiciaries have,
in some cases, developed their own approaches to the resolution of SLAPPs.
These courts rely on the federal Noerr-Pennington doctrine or, alternatively,
apply state judicial doctrine governing anti-SLAPP motions where such
doctrine has been established.
44 "[T~he threat of financial liability, litigation costs, destruction of one's business,
loss of one's home, and other personal losses from groundless lawsuits seriously impacts
government, interstate commerce, and individual rights by significantly chilling public
participation in government, public issues, and in voluntary service." Id
45 "[W~hile some courts and State legislatures have recognized and discouraged
SLAPPs, protection against SLAPPs has not been uniform or comprehensive." Id The
Ninth Circuit, holding that California's anti-SLAPP law is applicable in federal court,
noted the risk of forum shopping; the court reasoned that:
[TIhe twin purposes of the Erie rule-"-- discouragement of forum-shopping and
avoidance of inequitable administration of the law" -favor application of
California's Anti-SLAPP statute in federal cases. Although [Federal] Rules [of Civil
Procedure] 12 and 56 allow a litigant to test the opponent's claims before trial,
California's "special motion to strike" adds an additional, unique weapon to the
pretrial arsenal, a weapon whose sting is enhanced by a[n] entitlement to fees and
costs. Plainly, if the anti-SLAPP provisions are held not to apply in federal court, a
litigant interested in bringing menitless SLAPP claims would have a significant
incentive to shop for a federal forum. Conversely, a litigant otherwise entitled to the
protections of the Anti-SLAPP statute would find considerable disadvantage in a
federal proceeding. This outcome appears to run squarely against the "twin aims" of
the Erie doctrine.
United States ex rel. Newshamn v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963, 973
(9th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted); see also Bible & Gospel Trust v. Twinam, No. 2:07-
CV- 17, 2008 WL 5216845, at *2 (D. Vt. July 18, 2008) (summarizing the Ninth Circuit's
reasoning: "Under Hanna, (1) allowing the anti-SLAPP statute would discourage forum
shopping as plaintiffs would 'shop' for a federal forum to avoid the California law, and
(2) California defendants would be at a disadvantage against out-of-state plaintiffs
because they would lose the protections of the anti-SLAPP statute."); Price v. Stossel,
No. 07 Cv. 1 1364(SWK), 2008 WL 2434137, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2008) ("[Plaintiff]
apparently decided to refile his action, which was initially brought in California, in order
to avoid the immediate-appeal provision of California's anti-SLAPP statute. In light
of ... [his] apparent strategic refiling in this District, the Court accords no weight to
[plaintiff] 's most recent choice of forum." (citation omnitted)).
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a. The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine
Until a federal statutory remedy becomes available-which, some
speculate, will be later rather than sooner-litigants who believe they have
been "SLAPPed" must rely on a judicial remedy: the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine. The doctrine, which arose from a pair of Supreme Court cases
involving antitrust claims, represents the Court's articulation of the broad
immunity from suit granted to petitioning activities. The Noerr Court,
addressing truck operators' assertion that railroad operators' campaign to
influence state legislators was designed to render truck operators unable to
effectively compete with train operators in the freight transport business,46
concluded that "[t]he right of the people to inform their representatives in
government of their desires with respect to the passage or enforcement of
laws cannot properly be made to depend upon their intent in doing so."47 The
Court reiterated this conclusion four years later in Pennington,48 and went on
to explain the limited "sham" exception to the doctrine's broad immunity,
explicitly removing from its protection petitioning activities that are not
intended to affect government decision-making, and which have the sole
purpose of causing harm to the alleged SLAPPer.49 While motive is
46 E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 129
(1961).
47 Id at 139; see also United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657,
669 (1965) ("Nothing could be clearer from the [Noerr] Court's opinion than that
anticompetitive purpose did not illegalize the conduct there involved.").
48 Pennington, 381 U.S. at 670 ("Joint efforts to influence public officials do not
violate the antitrust laws even though intended to eliminate competition. Such conduct is
not illegal, either standing alone or as part of a broader scheme itself violative of the
Sherman Act.").
49 See Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 511 (1972)
("[Tjhere may be instances where the alleged conspiracy 'is a mere sham to cover what is
actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships
of a competitor and the application of the Sherman Act would be justified."' (quoting
Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144)). The Court further articulated the contours of the sham
exception in a subsequent antitrust decision:
The sham exception to Noerr encompasses situations in which persons use the
governmental process-as opposed to the outcome of that process-as an
anticompetitive weapon. A classic example is the filing of frivolous objections to the
license application of a competitor, with no expectation of achieving denial of the
license but simply in order to impose expense and delay. A sham situation involves
a defendant whose activities are not genuinely aimed at procuring favorable
government action at all, not one who genuinely seeks to achieve his governmental
result, but does so through improper means.
City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 380 (1991) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted) (rejecting a proposed conspiracy exception to the
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inapposite to the sham determination, in the sense that a proceeding that is
genuinely intended to influence government action will not be treated as a
sham, even where that government action is desired primarily for its
anticipated negative impact on competitors, petitioning activity that is
undertaken with the sole purpose of causing harm to competitors by way of
process rather than outcome will not be subject to Noerr-Pennington
immunity. 50 The Supreme Court further clarified the doctrine, "reject[ing] a
purely subjective definition of 'sham[]' [because] [t]he sham exception so
construed would undermine, if not vitiate, Noerr,"51 and established a two-
part analysis, involving both objective and subjective elements, for
identifying cases that fall within the exception:
First, the lawsuit must be objectively baseless in the sense that no
reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits. If an
objective litigant could conclude that. the suit is reasonably calculated to
elicit a favorable outcome, the suit is immunized under Noerr, and an
antitrust claim premised on the sham exception must fail. Only if
challenged litigation is objectively meritless may a court examine the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine); see also Daerr-Bannon, supra note 4, at 325 ("If the
[petitioning] activity was engaged in not to affect governmental action but to harass and
deter others from having 'free and unlimited access' to agencies and courts, then there is
an abuse of administrative and judicial process. .. ). Omni effectively narrowed the
sham exception, consistent with the doctrine's purpose of preserving the right of petition.
Id at 348 ("[Tjhe 'sham' exception was fully developed in Omni, a decision looked upon
by SLAPP targets as generally favorable and very definitively limiting and narrowing the
'shamn' exception.").
50 Cal. Motor, 404 U.S. at 5 10-11; see Christopher L. Sagers, The Legal Structure
of American Freedom and the Provenance of the Antitrust Immunities, 2002 UTAH L.
Ri~v. 927, 948 (2002) (discussing the influence of the Noerr line of cases on SLAPP
jurisprudence and noting that "[tlhe SLAPP phenomenon can be blamed in part on
California Motor's misguided dicta"). It has been suggested that:
It would be an advantage to SLAPP activists and the like if they sought only general
First Amendment protection against legal retaliation and just gave up on the
petitioning immunity. Unlike the antitrust doctrine, modem First Amendment
doctrine well recognizes the significance of distinguishing between commercial
expression, on the one hand, and more purely political conduct with more legitimate
and important claims to freedom on the other hand. Thus, the modem Court has
consistently held that First Amendment protections of political speech and
association vary depending on the character of the expressive actor. Businesses and
commercial groups cannot cloak self-interested and financially motivated conduct in
the same impenetrable protection as that which protects, say, civil rights activism.
This is a good thing, too, given the power and incentive for abuse often held by such
actors.
Id at 957.




litigant's subjective motivation. Under this second part of our definition of
sham, the court should focus on whether the baseless lawsuit conceals "an
attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor"
through the "use [of] the governmental process-as opposed to the outcome
of that process-as an anticompetitive weapon." 52
In the absence of contrary statutory language, the sham defense, though
limited,5 3 is the primary mechanism by which a party whose claim has been
identified as a SLAPP may avoid dismissal. 54
In the decades following Noerr and Pennington, the federal courts
extended Noerr's principle to cases outside of antitrust 1aw 5 5 -including
52 Id at 60-61 (citations omitted) (establishing a two-part definition for cases that
fall within the sham exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine and applying it in an
antitrust context). The Court emphasized that the exception from the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine eliminates just one of a number of hurdles that a plaintiff must clear in order to
prevail, adding to its conclusion the caveat that "[p]roof of a sham merely deprives the
defendant of immunity; it does not relieve the plaintiff of the obligation to establish all
other elements of his claim." Id. at 61.
53 The sham exception is narrow in scope, and may effectively be invoked only in a
limited set of circumstances. See Daerr-Bannon, supra note 4, at 348 ("Once the claim is
properly defined as a SLAPP, the SLAPPer must establish that no genuine petitioning
activity exists (and the case law defines such activity broadly) in order to defeat early and
sure dismissal of the claim." (emphasis added)).
5 4 Id at 347 ("Once a claim is acknowledged by the court to be a SLAPP, the only
real defense available will be the 'sham' exception. Irmmity for the SLAPP target will
generally be absolute .. 1)
55 See DirecTV, Inc. v. Milliman, No. 02-74829, 2003 WL 23892683, at *7 (E.D.
Mich. Aug. 26, 2003) ("As a First Amendment doctrine, [Noerr-Pennington] immunity
extends beyond antitrust claims." (citing Pennwalt Corp. v. Zenith Lab., Inc., 472 F.
Supp. 413, 424 (E.D. Mich. 1979))); Webb v. Fury, 282 S.E.2d 28, 36 (W. Va. 1981)
("[lt is apparent that the foundation of the [Noerr-Pennington] doctrine, and of the sham
exception rests upon solid First Amendment grounds rather than upon a limited
construction of the Sherman Act."); Daerr-Bannon, supra note 4, at 326 ("[The Noerr-
Pennington] line of cases exclusively involves antitrust allegations. However, .. . lower
courts have not been reluctant at all to apply the principles enunciated beyond the
antitrust arena, and ... [t]he U.S. Supreme Court appears to have acknowledged that
the ... doctrine has a broader application than simply to antitrust litigation."). Despite
this general acceptance, the application of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine outside of the
anti-SLAPP context has not escaped criticism. See, e.g., Joseph W. Beatty, The Legal
Literature on SLAPPs: A Look Behind the Smoke Nine Years After Pring and Canan First
Yelled "Fire!", 9 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 85, 101-03 (1997) (criticizing courts'
reliance on Prof 1 Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S.
49 (1993) and NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982) to support the
extension of Noerr-Pennington doctrine to cases outside of antitrust law); Mark J.
Sobczak, SLAPPed in Illinois: The Scope and Applicability of the Illinois Citizen
Participation Act, 28 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 559, 569 (2007) ("[Wlhile various federal courts,
including the Supreme Court, have used the logic of Noerr-Pennington beyond its
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abuse of process, 56 tortious interference, 57 and other causes of action
commonly used to disguise SLAPPs58-further reinforcing the protections
granted to petitioning activities. In more recent years, the doctrine has
emerged as a foundational element of both case law and commentary
discussing SLAPPs and anti-SLAPP legislation. 59 Anti-SLAPP measures,
like the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, have as their principal purpose the
protection of petitioning and speech rights articulated in state and federal
constitutions.60 In light of this common purpose, legislatures have looked to
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine as a guide for the development of state anti-
SLAPP statutes, 61 and the sham exception has been recognized by courts in
jurisdictions both with62 and without 63 anti-SLAPP measures. 64
antitrust origins, the propriety of doing so has been vigorously criticized." (footnotes
omitted)).
56 See, e.g., Brownsville Golden Age Nursing Home, Inc. v. Wells, 839 F.2d 155,
159-61 (3d Cir. 1988).
57 See, e.g., Havoco of Am., Ltd. v. Hollobow, 702 F.2d 643, 649 (7th Cir. 1983);
Virtual Works, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., No. CRIM. A. 99-1289-A, 1999 WL
1074122, at *1 (E.D. Va. 1999).
58 Balt. Scrap Corp. v. David J. Joseph Co., 81 F. Supp. 2d 602, 620 (D. Md. 2000),
aff'd, 237 F.3d 394 (4th Cir. 2001) ("Because the defendants' behavior is protected from
antitrust liability by the First Amendment under Noerr-Pennington, it is likewise
protected from state common law liability.").
59 Guam Greyhound, Inc. v. Brizill, No. CVAO7-021, 2008 WL 4206682, at *6 n.8
(Guam Sept. 11, 2008) ("Noerr and Pennington and the doctrine and cases they spawned
have been used to develop model SLAPP laws .... ").
60 See, e.g., United States v. Hempfling, 431 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1084 n.8 (E.D. Cal.
2006) ("[T]he Noerr-Pennington doctrine is a cousin to modem Anti-Slapp statutes.");
Hometown Props., Inc. v. Fleming, 680 A.2d 56, 61 (R.I. 1996) ("Like the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine, the [Rhode Island] anti-SLAPP statute was adopted in order to
protect valid petitioning activities."). Acknowledging the parallel principles underlying
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine and state anti-SLAPP laws, courts have relied on Noerr-
Pennington jurisprudence to guide their anti-SLAPP decisions. See, e.g., Milliman, 2003
WL 23892683, at *7 ("DirecTV argues that all of Milliman's counterclaims are barred
under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine .... [O]ther lawsuits involving DirecTV have been
dismissed based on similar state anti-SLAPP laws.").
61 In fact, Rhode Island's legislature amended the state's anti-SLAPP measure in
1995 to more clearly conform to the sham standard under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-33-2 (1997); Hometown Props., 680 A.2d at 62; see also LoBiondo
v. Schwartz, 970 A.2d 1007, 1020 (N.J. 2009) ("[Tlhe majority of the [state anti-SLAPP]
statutes find their roots in the United States Supreme Court's Noerr-Pennington doctrine,
creating immunity that protects actions that fall within the parameters of the redress of
one's grievances to the government.").
62 Some courts have relied on Noerr-Pennington case law in interpreting their
respective states' anti-SLAPP statutes, recognizing Noerr and its progeny as a guide for
both development and analysis of anti-SLAPP laws. See, e.g., Alves v. Hometown
Newspapers, Inc., No. CIV.A.2001-1030, 2002 WL 475282, at *7 (R.I. Super. Ct. Mar.
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b. State Judicial Doctrines
State legislatures that have not developed anti-SLAPP statutes have, in
many cases, had the issue brought to their attention. Public interest
organizations are not the only source of support for anti-SLAPP measures; a
Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice, discussing the challenges associated with
disposing of SLAPPs, suggested that "[tlhe legislature. . . consider the
experience of other states that have enacted anti-SLAPP statutes and consider
adopting legislation modeled upon the anti-SLAPP statutes in states like
California and Massachusetts [because] ... [t]he potential for the strategic
abuse of legal process is real."16 5 Courts have, in some instances, noted that
the absence of anti-SLAPP legislation has tied their hands with respect to
solving the SLAPP problem, while others have looked to the jurisprudence of
states that have established a statutory remedy. 66 A Connecticut court, noting
the absence of state anti-SLAPP legislation, decided a motion for summary
judgment arising from a purported SLAPP by using as guidance a series of
Rhode Island decisions construing that state's anti-SLAPP law.67 Other
14, 2002) ("The [Rhode Island] anti-SLAPP statute emulates the federal Noerr-
Pennington doctrine .... The Rhode Island Supreme Court has adopted the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine and has applied it to tort cases." (footnotes omitted)); Brizill, 2008
WL 4206682, at *9 ("Because section 17104 [of Guam's anti-SLAPP statute] spells out
what is covered by [Omni], we turn to that case to explain section 17 104's sham
exception." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
63 See Daefr-Bannon, supra note 4, at 351 ("If no precedent or statute has yet been
recognized in the jurisdiction, counsel will seek to have the Court apply Noerr-
Pennington and develop procedures for quick and early dismissal consistent with
Omni.").
64 A number of courts, in interpreting their respective states' anti-SLAPP statutes,
have explicitly relied on Noerr and its progeny as a guide. See, e.g., Ludwig v. Superior
Court of Riverside Cnty., 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 350, 360 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995); Margolis v.
Gosselin, No. CIV. A. 95-03837-A, 1996 WL 293481, at *3 (Mass. Super. Ct. May 22,
1996); see also LoBiondo v. Schwartz, 733 A.2d 516, 532 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1999) (describing pending state anti-SLAPP legislation that would "afford[] a litigation
immunity for citizens who make bona fide communications to a public entity regarding
matters of public interest with which they are concerned-in other words, the Noerr-
Pennington approach" (emphasis added)).
65 Lassa v. Rongstad, 718 N.W.2d 673, 710 (Wis. 2006) (Prosser, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted).
66 See, e.g., TES Franchising, LLC v. Feldman, 943 A.2d 406, 413 n.10 (Conn.
2008) ("The [lower] court rejected the defendant's SLAPP suit defense because
Connecticut has no anti-SLAPP statute and this is a statutory cause of action in other
jurisdictions.").
67 Zeller v. Consolini, No. CV 920060356S, 1999 WL 99192, at *5 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Feb. 17, 1999).
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courts have declined to determine the availability of anti-SLAPP remedies,68
while still others have held that viable alternatives to the problem of SLAPPs
exist, framing their analyses by comparing the remedies afforded by anti-
SLAPP laws with their respective judicial remedies. 69
Even where anti-SLAPP measures have been placed on the legislative
agenda, proponents have encountered significant obstacles to the passage of
corresponding legislation. South Carolina's legislature most recently began
consideration of an anti-SLAPP measure; the bill was introduced to the state
house of representatives and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary on
February 19, 2009, but no action has since been taken.70 Similarly, anti-
SLAPP legislation has been introduced in nine states71 that are presently
68 AVB Props., LLC v. Chesler, No. 05CA008702, 2006 WL 2390243, at *4 (Ohio
Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2006) (declining to reverse a trial court's grant of a directed verdict on
a SLAPP cause of action, noting that the "Court takes no stance on whether SLAPP
actions are cognizable under Ohio law").
69 See, e.g., Zeller, 1999 WL 99192, at *7 ("Our legislature may not have
promulgated anti-SLAPP legislation[,] ... nor has our Supreme Court expressly applied
the Noerr Pennington doctrine, but our common law of vexatious litigation is well
established as is our adherence to constitutional principles reflected in the Noerr
Pennington doctrine."); LoBiondo, 970 A.2d at 1012 ("[O]ur common law cause of action
for malicious use of process, although a disfavored one, is a viable response to a SLAPP
suit. . . ."); Tri-County Concrete Co. v. Uffinan-Kirsch, No. 76866, 2000 WL 1513696,
at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2000) ("The Ohio General Assembly has not yet chosen to
enact anti-SLAPP legislation, and this court is constrained from recognizing such an
action at this time. Beside, any party faced with this kind of lawsuit may avail herself of
the frivolous lawsuit statute, which affords to the grievant ample relief . . .
70 H.R. 3587, 118th Leg., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2009).
71 Colorado (H.R. 1192, 63d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2002); H.R. 01-1150, 63d
Leg., Ist Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2001)); Connecticut (H.R. 7374, 1991 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Conn.
1991); H.R. 1026, 1993 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 1993); S. 182, 1993 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Conn. 1993); S. 248, 1993 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 1993)); Kansas (S. 287, 1997 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Kan. 1997)); Michigan (H.R. 5036, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2009);
H.R. 6394, 2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2008); S. 1195, 2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich.
2004); H.R. 5592, 2002 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2002); H.R. 4709, 1997 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Mich. 1997)); New Hampshire (S. 661, 1994 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 1994)); New Jersey
(S. 745, 208th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 1998); Gen. Assem. 1788, 208th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(N.J. 1998); Gen. Assem. 1545, 207th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 1996); S. 643, 207th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (N.J. 1996)); South Carolina (H.R. 3587, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2009));
Texas (H.R. 1089, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2007); H.R. 1130, 2007 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Tex. 2007); H.R. 329, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2005); H.R. 2267, 2003 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Tex. 2003); H.R. 1834, 2001 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2001); H.R. 2723, 2001 Leg,
Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2001); H.R. 2488, 1999 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1999); H.R. 1319, 1997
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1997)); Virginia (S. 424, 1992-1993 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 1992)).
For additional information on these bills, as well as an overview of existing anti-SLAPP
legislation, see CALIFORNIA ANTI-SLAPP PROJECT,
http://www.casp.net/statutes/menstate.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2010).
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without statutory remedies for SLAPPs and, in a few of those states, it has
been rejected more than once. In Texas, for instance, eight different measures
were introduced between 1995 and 2009, but the state has yet to pass an anti-
SLAPP law. Texas's experience is illustrative of the general challenges
associated with the adoption of anti-SLAPP measures: some proposed
statutes were rejected early in the legislative process,72 while others failed to
reach enactment because of political disparities between the two houses of
the state's legislature,73 inconsistencies between legislative and executive
priorities, and the precedence assigned to other legislative efforts. 74 Only one
of these bills 7 5 has reached the governor, who summarily vetoed the measure,
objecting to its impact on the role of the courts and the responsibilities of
attorneys. 76
72 Neither H.R. 329, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2005) nor H.R. 1834, 77th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2001) passed the House Committee on Civil Practices.
73 H.R. 2723, 77th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2001) was approved by both houses of the
Texas legislature but was vetoed by the governor; H.R. 2488, 76th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex.
1999) passed in the House but failed in the Senate Committee on State Affairs; and
H.R. 2967, 74th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1995) passed the state house but, like the bill's
1999 counterpart, failed in the senate.
74' H.R. 2267, 78th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2003) was passed by the House
Committee on Civil Practices, but was not put to a vote in the house due to the body's
focus on redistricting. Similarly, H.R. 1319, 75th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1997) survived
committee but was not formally addressed by the house, which was under pressure to
address the numerous bills pending at the end of the regular session. More recent anti-
SLAPP proposals have also been relegated to the legislative backburner. H.R. 1089, 80th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2007) was introduced on February 5, 2007, and passed the House
Committee on Civil Practices on April 10, 2007; however, no further action has passed
since. Similarly, H.R. 1338, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2009) was introduced on
February 17, 2009, and unanimously passed the House Committee on Judiciary & Civil
Jurisprudence on May 1, 2009, but has not since advanced.
75 H.R. 2723, 77th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2001).
76 "House Bill No. 2723 is a radical departure from traditional concepts of our
adversarial justice system and the role of the courts. It also creates new causes of action
by holding lawyers liable for the accuracy of information provided to them by their
clients." HOUSE RESEARCH ORGANIZATION, Focus REPORT, H.R. 77-10, Reg. Sess., at 71
(Tex. 2001). Representative Richard Raymond, who authored the bill, later responded to
the governor's concerns about the responsibility placed on attorneys:
HB 2723 does not create a new cause of action against attorneys. They are currently
subject to Rule 13 requirements in state courts and Rule 11I requirements in federal
courts. A SLAPP plaintiff's lawyer would have knowledge he was suing on account
of testimony or information provided in another official proceeding. The bill applies
to suits alleging 'that the contents of or the filing of the complaint constitutes a basis
for relief . . .' Even then, the sanctions against a lawyer [would] not [be]
automatically applied but would be decided by a judge who must determine that the
attorney acted in bad faith, and whose decision on the matter is appealable.
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Colorado's legislature has been similarly unsuccessful in enacting anti-
SLAPP legislation, and has twice failed to pass proposed bills addressing the
matter. The first of these bills77 failed by a narrow margin in the state house
of representatives. During the following year, the house approved a new anti-
SLAPP bill, but the bill did not survive the Senate Public Policy and
Planning Committee. Although the legislature has declined to take on the
problem of SLAPPs, Colorado's judiciary has developed its own approach to
managing the frivolous suits. In Protect Our Mountain Environment, Inc. v.
District Court (poAM, 7 8 the state's supreme court heard an appeal from a
lower court's summary denial of a motion to dismiss a developer's complaint
against an environmental group. The developer had filed an application to
obtain rezoning for a 507-acre parcel of land near Evergreen, Colorado,79 and
the County Board of Commissioners approved the rezoning and amended the
county zoning map. Protect Our Mountain Environment (POME)
subsequently filed an action against the Board and the developer under a
state procedural rule enabling it to seek relief in the district court "[w]here an
inferior tribunal (whether court, board, commission or officer) exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions, has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its
discretion, and there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy otherwise
provided by law."80 POME asserted that because the Board failed to account
for environmental impacts and acted inconsistently with zoning laws, the
rezoning should be overturned.81 The district and appellate courts ruled
against POME, and the appellate court awarded the developer damages and
double costs.82 The developer then filed a complaint alleging that POME's
original suit was brought maliciously, seeking compensatory and exemplary
damages.83 POME filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that its Rule 106 suit
fell within the First Amendment's protection of petitioning activities.84 The
court, without receiving evidence or making findings, concluded that
POME's complaint was a "sham," and was not subject to First Amendment
Id. Currently, because no statutory remedy exists to dispose of SLAPPs, "[tlhe most
expeditious means for eliminating a SLAPP claim in Texas is to seek traditional
summary judgment on the basis of the U.S. and Texas Constitutions." Chad Baruch,
"Slapp "-ed Around: Defending Consumers from Retaliatory Litigation, 8 J. TEx.
CONSUMER L. 36, 37 (2004). However, sanctions are available to SLAPP targets who are
granted summary judgment on constitutional grounds. Id. at 39.
77 H.R. 0 1- 1150, 63d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 200 1).
78 677 P.2d 1361 (Colo. 1984).
79 Id at 1363.
80 COLO. R. Ctv. P. 106(a)(4).
81 POME, 677 P.2d at 1363-64.
82 1Id at 1364 n.4.




immunity. 85 The Colorado Supreme Court, in an opinion carefully reviewing
the Noerr line of cases and its underlying principles, 86 as well as the
limitations of the right to petition, reversed. 87 The supreme court, in reaching
its conclusion, explicitly adopted a new rule governing motions to dismiss
arising from petitioning activities.88 According to this rule, the motion should
be addressed as a motion for summary judgment and considered according to
a heightened standard of review, with the burden of proof shifted to the non-
moving party.89 In addition to adopting these procedural standards, courts
considering such motions should, after allowing the parties a "reasonable
opportunity to present all material pertinent," conduct a three-part inquiry:
[W]hen, as here, a plaintiff sues another for alleged misuse or abuse of the
administrative or judicial processes of government, and the defendant files a
motion to dismiss by reason of the constitutional right to petition, the
plaintiff must make a sufficient showing to permit the court to reasonably
conclude that the defendant's petitioning activities were not immunized
from liability under the First Amendment because: (1) the defendant's
administrative or judicial claims were devoid of reasonable factual support,
or, if so supportable, lacked any cognizable basis in law for their assertion;
and (2) the primary purpose of the defendant's petitioning activity was to
harass the plaintiff or to effectuate some other improper objective; and (3)
the defendant's petitioning activity had the capacity to adversely affect a
legal interest of the plaintiff.90
The court, acknowledging the importance of balancing opposing parties'
First Amendment rights, concluded that this analytical approach "will
safeguard the constitutional right of citizens to utilize the administrative and
judicial processes for redress of legal grievances without fear of retaliatory
litigation and, at the same time, will permit those truly aggrieved by abuse of
these processes to vindicate their own legal rights."9' As a result of the
model's ability to strike such a balance, POME, like the Noerr line of cases,
has been identified as a model for courts, legislatures, and scholars
8 5 Id
86 Id. at 1365-67.
87 POMIE, 677 P.2d at 1370.
88 Id
89 Id. at 1368-69.
90 Id. at 1369.
91 Id; George W. Pring & Penelope Canan, "Strategic Lawsuits Against Public
Participation " ("SLAPPs"): an Introduction for Bench, Bar, and Bystanders, 12
BRIDGEPORT L. REv. 937, 952-53 (1992) ("The POMP test removes the normal barriers
to early dismissal through its creative identification, burden-shifting, and proof elements.
It is a hard test for filers to overcome, but a workable balance between protecting the
target's constitutional Petition Rights and the filer's personal rights.").
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addressing SLAPPs.92 Pring and Canan once suggested that "[tlhe POMNE
test is a 'cure' well worth adopting in other jurisdictions," 93 and
commentators continue to acknowledge the POMEf test's advantages as a
remedy for SLAPPs. 94
B. Validity
The debate over scope and implementation of anti-SLAPP legislation is
meaningless without a preliminary discussion of enforceability. As with
other characteristics of anti-SLAPP law, constitutional validity of existing or
proposed anti-SLAPP measures varies according to statute and jurisdiction.
Among the constitutional concerns most commonly raised in the context of
anti-SLAPP law are equal protection and due process. 95
1. Equal Protection
State anti-SLAPP statutes have also been challenged on equal protection
grounds. In California, for instance, a SLAPP plaintiff (More University)
asserted that the state's anti-SLAPP law violated its right to equal protection
by interfering with its ability to engage in the judicial process. 96 The court, in
92 Prmng & Cana, supra note 91, at 953.
93 Id
94 One commentator recently proposed that POME be incorporated into California's
anti-SLAPP statute to balance First Amendment interests and serve as a deterrent to
prospective bad-faith SLAPP filers. See Jeremiah A. Ho, Note, I'll Huff and I'll Puff-
But Then You 'll Blow Mfy Case Away: Dealing with Dismissed and Bad-Faith Defendants
Under California 's Anti-SLAPP Statute, 30 WHiTrrIER L. Rnv. 533, 618 (2009).
95 Constitutional challenges to anti-SLAPP laws have not been limited to equal
protection and due process, although they are among the most commonly raised concerns.
Other constitutional challenges have arisen, for instance, from statutes' purportedly vague
language. The Rhode Island Supreme Court addressed a claim that "issues of public
concern" is unconstitutionally vague, and once again upheld the state's anti-SLAPP
statute as consistent with the state and federal constitutions. Global Waste Recycling, Inc.
v. Mallette, 762 A.2d 1208, 1214 (R.I. 2000). A Louisiana state court rejected a similar
constitutional challenge to the construction of state anti-SLAPP legislation, which also
contains "probability of success" language. Lee v. Pennington, 830 So. 2d 1037, 1042
(La. Ct. App. 2002), cert. denied, 836 So. 2d 52 (La. 2003). The court concluded that the
phrase was not unconstitutionally vague, noting that its interpretation was informed by
case law and legislative intent. Id The court explained that its "holding in Stern clearly
articulates the standard to be applied in determining the 'probability of success' as the
standard and/or elements of the tort the plaintiff alleges the defendant committed,
coupled with the legislative intent set forth when the statute was enacted." Id. (discussing
Stem v. Doe, 806 So. 2d 98, 101 (La. Ct. App. 200 1)).
96 See, e.g., Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Publ'g Co., 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 46
(Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
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response, explained that the statute's classification of litigants bore a rational
relationship to the legislature's objective of discouraging frivolous
litigation. 97 The court also emphasized that the anti-SLAPP provision did not
prohibit any particular category of complaints, but rather specified an
approach that would allow courts to consider the merit of certain claims
during the initial phase of litigation. 98
A Louisiana appellate court relied on a similar rationale in rejecting an
equal protection challenge to Louisiana' s anti-SLAPP statute.99 The
challenge arose from the statute's exemption of actions brought on behalf of
the state from anti-SLAPP measures. 100 The court responded that the
legislature has broad authority to establish statutory categories, and because
the law does not use explicitly prohibited criteria-race, religion, age,
gender, culture, politics, or physical characteristics-to establish categories,
the anti-SLAPP law would pass constitutional muster as long as it furthered a
legitimate state interest. 101 The court briefly discussed the First Amendment
values underlying the statute, noting the corresponding state interest, and
emphasized that the statute did not exclude any individual or group from the
judicial process-)02 Consistent with this conclusion, modem anti-SLAPP
jurisprudence generally suggests that equal protection challenges do not
presently pose a significant threat to state anti-SLAPP statutes.
2. Due Process
Anti-SLAPP statutes have repeatedly been challenged on due process
grounds, often as a result of their respective burden-shifting mechanisms. A
number of state anti-SLAPP laws are administered by way of a two-pronged
97 The court explained that "[s]tatutes that classify litigants and impose differing
procedural requirements are generally valid so long as classification is supported by a
rational basis," concluding that "[t]he procedure mandated by section 425.16 is rationally
related to the Legislature's expressed goal" of curbing a "disturbing increase" in
SLAPPs. Id at 52 (discussing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West 1993)).
9 8 Id ("The statute does not bar complaints which arise from a person's exercise of
his or her rights of free speech or petition for redress of grievances, but only provides a
mechanism through which such complaints can be evaluated at an early stage of the
litigation process.").
99 Lee, 830 So. 2d at 1043.
100 LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 971(E) (2005) provides: "This Article shall not
apply to any enforcement action brought on behalf of the state of Louisiana by the
attorney general, district attorney, or city attorney acting as a public prosecutor."
101 Lee, 830 So. 2d at 1042.
102 Id at 1042-43.
20101 865
866 ~OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL [o.7:
test.103 The SLAPP defendant initially bears the burden of establishing that
the actions at issue are protected under the statute. 104 If this threshold inquiry
is satisfied, the burden shifts to the plaintiff; if the plaintiff cannot
demonstrate some level of merit underlying his claims, the defendant
prevails. 105 The remedies for victorious SLAPP defendants vary among
jurisdictions, but dismissal and attorney's fees are most common. This
system supports both the protection of First Amendment rights and the
furtherance of judicial economy. Because neither party is required to
establish the intent of the other-a showing which nearly always requires
discovery-the burden-shifting approach allows for SLAPPs to be efficiently
managed and quickly dismissed. If SLAPP defendants who successfully
invoke an anti-SLAPP statute are nonetheless required to participate in costly
litigation, the statutes' ability to curb frivolous lawsuits intended to silence
public speech may become negligible. The Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute
does not follow the typical burden-shifting model and, consequently, allows
SLAPP plaintiffs to entangle defendants in burdensome litigation. The statute
modifies the first prong of the majority inquiry by requiring that the
defendant establish that the plaintiff's claims are based exclusively on
protected actions.106 It then substitutes for the second prong a requirement
that the plaintiff prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
defendant's actions caused actual harm and were without factual and legal
support. 107 Also available to the plaintiff is the opportunity to establish, as a
defense, the defendant's mental state, which often requires extensive-and
burdensome--discovery.
Noticeably absent from the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP inquiry is the
merit of the plaintiffs claims. California's anti-SLAPP statute, in contrast to
Massachusetts's law,' 08 provides that if the defendant establishes a prima
facie case that the actions underlying the litigation are protected, the burden
shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the
103 California's anti-SLAPP statute is commonly cited for this approach. CAL. Civ.
PROC. CODE § 425.16(b) (West 2004).
104 Id.
105 Lee, 830 So. 2d at 1041.
106 See Ehrlich v. Stem, 908 N.E.2d 797, 802-03 (Mass. App. Ct. 2009) ("[T]he
anti-SLAPP inquiry produces an all or nothing result as to each count the complaint
contains. Either the count survives the inquiry or it does not, and the statute does not
create a process for parsing counts to segregate components that can proceed from those
that cannot."). In California, by contrast, "[w]here a complaint contains both SLAPP and
non-SLAPP causes of action, the SLAPP claims alone may be stricken." Summit Media
LLC v. City of L.A., Cal., 530 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1095 (C.D. Cal. 2008); Shekhter v. Fin.
Indem. Co., 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 843. 849 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).




merits.' 09 To satisfyi this burden, the plaintiff "must demonstrate that the
complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie
showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by
the plaintiff is credited."" 0 Because the plaintiff generally must meet this
burden prior to conducting discovery, it represents a significant obstacle to
moving forward with the litigation, even where the claim is legitimate-and
that is the observation from which due process challenges have emerged.
Merit requirements in state anti-SLAPP statutes, though advantageous
from the perspective of judicial economy, have repeatedly been challenged
on due process grounds. Among the claims underlying a 1994 constitutional
challenge to California's then-current anti-SLAPP provision was an assertion
that by requiring the court to consider the evidence in reaching a conclusion
on a motion to strike made pursuant to the statute, the law improperly denied
the plaintiff the right to a jury trial."'I Accordingly, the challengers asserted,
the law infringed upon plaintiffs' due process rights by requiring that they
establish a claim's probability of success prior to discovery, and that, in that
case, discovery would reveal a triable issue of fact related to malice. 112 The
California court rejected the constitutional challenge, but objections to anti-
SLAPP statutes' burden-shifting systems continued to emerge on due process
gons 13
State courts in Maine'1 14 and Louisiana have also rejected due process
challenges to the states' anti-SLAPP statutes. A Louisiana court rebutted an
assertion that the state's anti-SLAPP statute denies litigants due process of
law by requiring that the trial court determine the plaintiffs probability of
success on the merits before allowing the case to go before a jury, explaining
that anti-SLAPP motions turned on questions of law, which are reserved for
109 CAL. CwV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b) (West 2004). The Louisiana and Oregon anti-
SLAPP statutes also require that the plaintiff establish a probability of prevailing. LA.
CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 97 1(A) (2005); OR. REV. STAT. § 31.150 (2007); see Baxter v.
Scott, 847 So. 2d 225, 230 (La. Ct. App. 2003); Gardner v. Martino, 563 F.3d 981, 986
(9th Cir. 2009).
110 Matson v. Dvorak, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 880, 886 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995); see also
Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche, 74 P.3d 737, 744 (Cal. 2003); Navellier v. Sletten,
52 P.3d 703, 708 (Cal. 2002); Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester, 50 P.3d 733, 739
(Cal. 2002).
111 Dixon v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 687, 696 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
13I.at 696-97.
114 Maietta Constr., Inc. v. Wainwright, No. CV 02-594, 2003 WL 23148892, at *3
(Me. Super. Ct. July 29, 2003) (rebutting plaintiffs' assertion that the Maine anti-SLAPP
statute denied them due process by interfering with their right to trial by jury, reasoning
that "[t]he Law Court has dismissed a suit under the anti-SLAPP statute thereby
implicitly recognizing the right of the Legislature to pass such a statute. Hence, there is
no obvious due process violation." (citation omitted)).
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the court, not a jury.' 5 The court explained that, where the anti-SLAPP
statute has been invoked, the non-moving party need only show a probability
of success at trial based upon the elements of his claim, a determination
which does not require the trial judge to weigh the evidence. 116 A California
appellate court used similar reasoning to explain the constitutionality, in the
context of the right to trial by jury, of that state's anti-SLAPP provision.1 7
Moreover, the California Supreme Court has noted that the legislature, in
developing the state's anti-SLAPP provision, took measures to avoid
wrongfully depriving the non-moving party of the right to trial by jury.' 18
While anti-SLAPP measures have generally survived constitutional
challenges based on due process and jury trial rights, constitutional concerns
led the New Hampshire legislature to abandon an anti-SLAPP bill, which
was developed with the California anti-SLAPP statute as a model. The
proposed law required that, in order to avoid dismissal, a plaintiff establish
115 Lee, 830 So. 2d at 1043 ("[Tjhe only purpose of [the state's anti-SLAPP
provision] is to act as a procedural screen for meritless suits, which is a question of law
for a court to determine at every stage of a legal proceeding.").
116 Id
117 Moore v. Shaw, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 154, 161-62 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) ("[Slection
425.16 is analogous to other statutes requiring the plaintiff to make a threshold showing,
which are aimed at eliminating meritless litigation at an early stage.... [It] does not
impair the right to a trial by jury because the trial court does not weigh the evidence in
ruling on the motion, but merely determines whether a prima facie showing has been
made which would warrant the claim going forward. Whether or not the evidence is in
conflict, if the plaintiff has presented a sufficient pleading and has presented evidence
showing that a prima facie case will be established at trial, the plaintiff is entitled to
proceed." (citations omitted)); see also Berg & Berg Enters., LLC v. Sherwood Partners,
Inc., 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d 325, 334 n.7 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) ("The court does not weigh the
evidence but instead merely assesses whether the plaintiff has stated and substantiated his
or her claim. . ... So applied, the statute passes constitutional muster in preserving the
right to trial by jury.").
11 S.B. Beach Props. v. Berti, 138 P.3d 713, 716-17 (Cal. 2006) ("The Legislature
originally passed an anti-SLAPP bill that contained a 'pleading hurdle' which prohibited
a person from pleading a SLAPP suit cause of action until a court granted leave to do so
after demonstration of a 'substantial probability' of success on the merits. The Governor
vetoed this bill. The Legislature then passed Senate Bill No. 1264, which became section
425.16. Unlike the previous enactment, Senate Bill No. 1264 gave plaintiffs an
unencumbered opportunity to make SLAPP suit allegations, prior to the motion to strike
hearing. ... This movement-from a 'pleading hurdle' to a mandatory special motion to
strike-was made at the request of the State Bar's Committee on the Administration of
Justice (Committee), which is concerned that a 'pleading hurdle' may violate a plaintiff s
constitutional right to a jury trial. The Committee is more comfortable with the 'motion
to strike' approach, which permits the plaintiff some opportunity to conduct discovery
while preserving the ability of the defendant to dismiss the lawsuit at an early, and,
perhaps, inexpensive stage." (internal citations and quotation marks omnitted)).
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",a probability of prevailing on the claim....... 19 The senate consulted the
judiciary to determine if the anti-SLAPP statute was consistent with the
state's constitution, and the court, citing the merit requirement, concluded
that the statute would violate the constitution by interfering with plaintiffs'
right to trial by jury.120 Although the New Hampshire court reached this
conclusion on state constitutional grounds, their conclusion further reinforces
the plausibility of the due process argument against anti-SLAPP provisions.
C. Applicability
The efficacy of anti-SLAPP measures is particularly limited where
SLAPP targets-or, of greater concern, those who are silenced by fear of
becoming targets-do not know with certainty whether the statutory
protections will be available to them in case of litigation. Although this
concern is pervasive, and is affected by nearly every provision of an anti-
SLAPP statute, more clearly defining the "who" and "what" underlying the
anti-SLAPP inquiry would provide greater certainty. Just as homeowners
associations and condominium unit owners have obtained explicit protection
from SLAPPs under Florida law,' 21 other groups and activities could benefit
from explicit immunity. This section provides, as an example, a statutory
provision common to the anti-SLAPP law, and sets forth examples of both
status and subject matter for which, if explicitly protected, would reinforce
the purpose of anti-SLAPP laws.
I. Protected Activities and the Public Concern Requirement
A majority of the enacted state anti-SLAPP statutes stipulate that, in
order to successfully invoke the law, a litigant's purportedly protected
communication must have been about a matter of public concern. The
rationale underlying this requirement is that anti-SLAPP measures will be
available only where the defendants' conduct involved legitimate petitioning
activity. The presence or absence of the public concern criteria has, in certain
contexts, a significant impact on the outcome of anti-SLAPP motions and
illustrates the fundamental importance of clear statutory terms.
Massachusetts is among the states in which the public concern standard
has generated a great deal of uncertainty .and accompanying litigation. The
"public concern" concept, which is inherently equivocal,122 is further
119 S. 661, 1994 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 1994).
120 Opinion of the Justices (SLAPP Suit Procedure), 641 A.2d 10 12 (N.H. 1994).
121 See FLA. STAT. § § 718.1224, 720.304(4) (2010).
122 The Massachusetts Supreme Court, discussing the state's anti-SLAPP statute,
acknowledged this interpretive challenge:
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convoluted by courts' inconsistent interpretation of anti-SLAPP statutes with
respect to the public concern requirement. The Massachusetts Anti-SLAPP
Act, enacted in 1994, was initially treated as containing a public concern
requirement; in 1996, a state superior court judge denied an anti-SLAPP
motion in a case (Sullivan) involving a housing dispute between ex-spouses,
concluding that the litigation involved a private interest and not a matter of
public concern.123 The court relied on a Colorado Supreme Court decision
interpreting that state's public concern constraint,124 as well as the legislative
history of the Massachusetts law. 125 Since that decision, however, the state's
courts have abandoned this view; the state's supreme court, upholding a
lower court decision,' 26 held that the availability of anti-SLAPP motions
does not turn on a public concern standard.' 27 Like the Sullivan court, the
state supreme court relied on legislative history; however, in contrast to the
Sullivan court, it focused on textual amendments to the original anti-SLAPP
bill rather than the floor debates.'128 Because the phrase "Public concern" had
been eliminated from the bill's text prior to enactment, the court concluded
that the legislature had intentionally omitted the term from the enacted
law.129
We recognize that distinguishing matters of public from matters of private concern
is not always clear-cut. Such a consideration is reflected in Justice Thurgood
Marshall's objection to creating a conditional constitutional privilege for defamation
published in connection with an event that is found to be of "public or general
concern": "assuming that. ... courts are not simply to take a poll to determine
whether a substantial portion of the population is interested or concerned in a
subject, courts will be required to somehow pass on the legitimacy of interest in a
particular event or subject," even though courts "are not anointed with any
extraordinary prescience."
Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Prods. Corp., 691 N.E.2d 935, 941 n. 14 (Mass. 1998) (quoting
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 79 (197 1) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
123 Sullivan v. Murphy, 5 Mass. L. Rep. 3, 68 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1996), cert. denied,
435 Mass. 1107 (Mass. 2001).
124 Protect Our Mountain Env't, Inc. v. District Court (POME), 677 P.2d 1361
(Colo. 1984). POMEf involved Colorado's judicial doctrine governing cases that have
been defined by statute in other states as SLAPPs; Colorado's legislature has not, to date,
enacted an anti-SLAPP measure.
125 Sullivan, 5 Mass. L. Rep. at 68.
126 Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Prods. Corp., 678 N.E.2d 1196 (Mass. App. Ct.
1997).
127 Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Prods. Corp., 691 N.E.2d 935, 941-42 (Mass. 1998).
18I.at 94 1.
129 Id. ("[D]espite expressions in the legislative debate about the need to protect the
right of petition on matters of public concern, the phrase was removed from the
text . . .. [It is inappropriate for a judge to reinsert the rejected condition that the moving
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Massachusetts, though certainly in the minority,' 30 is not alone in
forgoing a public concern requirement in its anti-SLAPP law; Illinois' anti-
SLAPP measure 31 is also without such subject matter criteria. Critics have
suggested that the omission of a public concern standard, though certainly
advantageous to some, is inconsistent with the purported purpose of anti-
SLAPP law.'132 The balance the model strikes between opposing parties' First
Amendment rights is of particular concern, as it is often neglected by
commentary on this area of the law. The assertion of those rights has the
potential to be both a sword and a shield. One commentator, reviewing the
Illinois anti-SLAPP statute, articulated the potential for abuse of the anti-
SLAPP motion in the absence of a public concern requirement confining
anti-SLAPP motions to cases involving matters under review by a
governmental entity:
These statutes tip the scales decidedly in favor of a defendant's right to
petition or speech at the expense of a plaintiffs right to access the courts.
The result is the potential for a paradoxical form of vexatious litigation.
While anti-SLAPP statutes are designed, at least in part, to avoid the use of
judicial processes themselves as a means of intimidating or punishing an
opponent, the most broadly drawn anti-SLAPP statutes arguably have the
same effect on potential plaintiffs because they expand use of anti-SLAPP
remedies to conduct that has little or no connection to the traditional SLAPP
paradigm. 13 3
Where a defendant is able to prevail on a bad faith anti-SLAPP motion,
the success of the anti-SLAPP motion comes at the expense of the opposing
party's petitioning rights: "[s]uch an encroachment is not as direct as the
filing of a SLAPP action. Instead, the interference is subtle and indirect when
an anti-SLAPP motion is used to justify a defendant's meritless exercise of
party's activity must involve a matter of public concern." (internal quotation marks
omnitted)).
130 For an overview of the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute and the state courts'
approach to the issue of public concern, see Jessica Block, Civil Procedure-Special
Motion to Dismiss-A nti-SLAPP Statute, 91 MASS. L. REv. 97, 98 (2008) ("[The
Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute] appears to be the lone anti-SLAPP statute in the
United States that does not require that petitioning activity be 'of public concern,' the
Legislature having dropped that requirement, which was included in a previous, rejected
iteration of the bill. The statute encompasses matters of both private and public
interests.").
131 For an overview of the Illinois Citizen Participation Act, see Sobczak, supra note
55, at 559.
132 See Ho, supra note 94, at 619.
133 Id at 5 80-8 1.
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political process while knocking out a plaintiff s genuine cause of action."1134
In the absence of a statutory remedy, it is difficult for courts to "separat[e]
the wolves from the sheep."' 35
Because the public concern requirement is absent in some state statutes,
and present but unclear in others, the efficacy of anti-SLAPP measures-and
the ability of individuals and groups that might otherwise be silenced to rely
on them-could be substantially improved by adding language clarifying
those matters which are, by their nature, to be protected by law.
2. Defining Public Concern
The debate surrounding anti-SLAPP legislation has resulted in a body of
literature analyzing the measures as falling somewhere along a linear
spectrum from broad to narrow, with respect to the activities and parties they
protect.' 36 Among the statutes that have been described as "narrow" are those
which limit protected petitioning activities to statutorily specified causes of
action.137 or subject matter. Pennsylvania's anti-SLAPP law, for instance, is
viewed as narrow relative to other anti-SLAPP measures because it extends
only to petitioning activities "relating to enforcement or implementation of
an environmental law or regulation."'138 Other statutes limit not the subject
matter, but rather the status of the parties engaged in the lawsuit. Florida's
anti-SLAPP law, for instance, makes its remedy' 39 available only to
134 Ho, supra note 94, at 594.
13 5 Id. at 619.
136 See, e.g., Shannon Hartzler, Note, Protecting Informed Public Particip'ation:
Anti-SLAPP Law and the Media Defendant, 41 VAL. U. L. REv. 1235, 1238 (2007)
("[T]his Note categorizes the different definitions of protected activity under [state] anti-
SLAPP statutes as [n]arrow, [mioderate, or [biroad."); London Wright-Pegs, Note, The
Media SLAPP Back: An Analysis of California's Anti-SLAPP Statute and the Media
Defendant, 16 UCLA ENT. L. REv. 323, 332 (2009) ("Many states have drafted and
interpreted their anti-SLAPP statutes differently, varying on the degree of protected
activity. The statutes can be separated into three categories: narrow, moderate and
broad.").
137 Oklahoma's anti-SLAPP statute, for instance, limits its protection to libel cases.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1443.1 (1999).
138 27 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8302 (2002); see Hartzler, supra note 136, at 1250
("Pennsylvania's anti-SLAPP statute falls into the category of narrow statutes because by
its title, it applies only to environmental law or regulation.").
13 "A person or entity may petition the court for an order dismissing the action or




defendants being sued by a "governmental entity,"' 40 and the state's
supplemental anti-SLAPP measures, passed in 2008, provide additional
protection to a defined class of defendants, specifically "prohibiting
[SLAPPs] by governmental entities, business entities, and individuals against
condominium unit owners who address matters concerning their
condominium association "1141 as well as "parcel owners who address matters
concerning their homeowners' association." 142 These statutes recognize
certain groups as uniquely susceptible to the legal claims that anti-SLAPP
statutes seek to deter, and provide valuable guidance for courts faced with the
task of identify'ing legitimate anti-SLAPP motions. Accordingly, this Note
proposes that legislatures enumerate categories of litigants which, as a matter
of public policy, deserve explicit protection from intimidation by litigation.
Two examples discussed here, environmental protection and expert opinion,
illustrate the value of defining matters of public interest-and allowing the
courts to "fill in the blanks" rather than leaving them to write the entire book.
a. Defining Protected Subject Matter: The Environmental Protection
Example
Environmental protection, though ,in certain contexts a highly
controversial subject, is undoubtedly a matter of public concern. Intuition
suggests that the quality of the air we breathe, the water we drink, and the
land upon which we live affects every member of the public and is,
accordingly, a quintessential matter of public concern. Recognizing the
public's substantial interest in environmental protection, federal and state
legislatures have codified not only the interest itself, but also the role that
citizens are to play in protecting that interest. While the notice-and-comment
process 43 is an acknowledgement of the broad role of the public in
governmental decision-making, it is the provision for citizen suits in various
federal and state statutes that underscores the exceptional importance of
public participation in environmental protection.'"4 Citizen suit provisions
140 FLA. STAT. § 768.295(2) (2010); see also Monique Leahy, Key Supporting
Citations- 'SLAPP " Lawsuits-Authority, in 20 FLA. PRAc., SUM. JDGMT. & REL. TERM.
MOTIONS § 3:27 (2009).
141 FLA. STAT. § 7 18.1224(1) (2010).
142 FLA. STAT. § 720.304(4) (2010).
14 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-553(c) (2006).
144 Citizen suit provisions are not confined to environmental laws. In fact, citizen
suit provisions in civil rights acts served as a guide for parallel provisions in federal
environmental statutes (which, in turn, were used as models for state statutes). Zygmunt
J.B. Plater, Facing a Time of Counter-R evolution-The Kepone Incident and a Review of
First Principles, 29 U. RICH. L. REv. 657, 701 (1995). However, these provisions are
particularly prevalent among environmental statutes. Federal statutes containing citizen
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have proven to be tools essential to the enforcement of various environmental
statutes; enforcement of the National Environental Policy Act (NEPA), for
instance, has been undertaken almost exclusively by private individuals and
organizations.'145 These provisions establish for the public an active role in
the enforcement of environmental laws and the long-term maintenance of
environmental quality. The principles underlying the establishment-and the
success-of citizen suit provisions in the enforcement of environmental law
support the establishment of explicit protections for petitioning activities
related to environmental protection. SLAPPs not only deter individuals and
groups from fulfilling their statutorily granted responsibility to support the
suit provisions include, among others, the following: Toxic Substances Control Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 2618(d), 2619 (2006); Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1540(g)(4) (2006); Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C.
§ 1270(d) (2006); Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1427(c)
(2006); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (2006); Marine Protection, Research, and
Sanctuaries Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(4) (2006); Deepwater Port Act of 1974, 33 U.S.C.
§ 15 15(d) (2006); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8(d) (2006); Noise Control
Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 4911l(d) (2006); Energy Sources Development Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 585 1(e)(2) (2006); Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6305(d) (2006);
Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e) (2006); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7604, 7607(f) (2006); Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Act, 42 U.S.C. § 8435(d)
(2006); Ocean Thermal Energy Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9 124(d) (2006); Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1349(a)(5) (2006). See Plater, supra, at 701
n. 105; see also Daerr-Bannon, supra note 4, at 343 ("Because SLAPP occurs most
frequently in the environmental arena and citizen enforcement of environmental laws is
important, citizen-suit provisions are part of... major environmental statutes");
Elizabeth Magill, Standing for the Public: A Lost History, 95 VA. L. REv. 1131, 1187-90
(2009) (discussing the significance of citizen suit provisions in federal environmental law
and explaining that the first such provision, contained in the Clean Air Act of 1970,
"imagined citizens as both private enforcers of existing EPA dictates as well as direct
watchdogs on EPA activities"). For a discussion of state law citizen suit provisions, see
Susan George, et al., The Public in Action: Using State Citizen Suit Statutes to Protect
Biodiversity, 6 U. BAIT. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 14-20 (1997); Edward Lloyd, Citizen Suits and
Defenses Against Them, SP059 ALI-ABA 781, 814-17 (2009).
145 Plater, supra note 144, at 701-02 ("[Hlow many enforcement actions have been
brought against federal agencies by Congress, the President, or the Department of Justice
for violations of [NEPA]? The answer is obvious: virtually zero. The hundreds of law
suits which have made NEPA a significant environmental protection statute ... have
been brought by private citizens."). Citizen suits are, in many instances, the sole means
for catalyzing governmental action to support environmental protection. Id at 702
("Many of us who have worked with citizen groups have on occasion been asked by a
federal official, 'Please tell me you will sue me if I don't do what the law requires, so that
I can go to my superiors and tell them that we must enforce the law."'); id.
("Environmental law ... has been formed by civically-driven citizen




enforcement of environmental laws,14 6 they also stifle petitioning activities
which, although outside the scope of citizen suit provisions, are wholly
consistent with the rationales underlying those provisions. The very citizens
and organizations that have sought to protect the public and the environment
by way of citizen suits and related petitioning activities have too often found
themselves with the perverse reward of a SLAPP. 14 7
Courts faced with SLAPP litigation have repeatedly acknowledged the
importance of citizen participation in environmental protection. A New York
court, addressing a frivolous lawsuit brought by a developer against a
nonprofit conservation organization, noted that:
[T]he participation of citizen watch groups in environmental planning has
been "essential to ensure that governmental efforts at environmental
protection are fully effective." A number of citizen suits "have established
essential principles of early review and strict adherence to the procedures
laid out in [the State Environmental Quality Review Act 14 8] which have
served as crucial tools in making projects safe for the environment." Citizen
activism, if it is to continue, must be fostered and protected from lawsuits
designed solely or primarily to intimidate and extract a price for
participation. 149
The Colorado Supreme Court implicitly adopted a similar view in deciding
Protect Our Mountain Environment, Inc. v. District Court (POME),150 which
involved a SLAPP suit brought by a developer against an environmental
group. 1 5' In deciding POMIE, the court articulated the state's anti-SLAPP
judicial doctrine, which remains intact in Colorado, and as noted, has
146 See George, et al., supra note 144, at 27-28 (identifying SLAPPs as a deterrent
to the filing of citizen suits under environmental statutes); James Olmsted, Handling the
Land Use Case: A User's Manual for the Public Interest Attorney, 19 J. ENVTL. L. &
LITIG. 23, 38 n. 12 (2004) ("SLAPP suits may follow unsuccessful citizen suits and are
meant to discourage citizens from bringing such lawsuits in the future.").
147 See Cymie Payne, Local Regulation of Natural Resources: Efficiency,
Effectiveness, and Fairness of Wetlands Permitting in Massachusetts, 28 ENVTL. L. 519,
560 (1998) ("Possibly the greatest threat to conservation commissions and similar forms
of citizen participation in government is the strategic lawsuit against public
participation. .. .)14 8 NY. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8.6 (McKinney 1976).
149 Gordon v. Marrone, 151 Misc. 2d 164, 169-70 (N.Y. 1991) (quoting Robert
Abrams, N.Y. State Att'y Gen., Address at Center for Environmental Legal Studies, Pace
University School of Law (Oct. 14, 1989)).
150 677 P.2d 1361, 1369 (Colo. 1984).
151 Id. at 1370 (anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss should not have been denied where a
developer brought suit against an environmental group that sought to have a rezoning
decision benefitting the developer reversed).
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influenced courts and legislatures in other jurisdictions. The fundamental
importance of citizen participation in environmental law and
policymaking, 152 in conjunction with the unique vulnerability-resulting
from both status 153 and focus 1 5 4 -of those individuals and groups that
engage in relevant petitioning activities to retaliatory lawsuits, suggest that
the anti-SLAPP measures should not leave protection for such activities open
to attack by SLAPPers. 155
b. Defining Protected Status: The Expert Opinion Example
In both the legislature and the courtroom, expert opinion and testimony is
an essential component of various decision-making processes. Those who
hold particular credentials in their respective fields are explicitly
distinguished from laypersons with respect to their role in governmental
action, and the policy underlying that distinction supports the extension of
anti-SLAPP measures to instances in which experts are sued for their
involvement with governmental decision-making.
152 Plater, supra note 144, at 697-98, 702 (discussing "the critical role that has been
played and will continue to be played by citizens actively engaged in environmental law"
and arguing that "government cannot do it alone.... [B]ureaucratic regulators have never
been and can never be a sufficient public counterweight to the industrial marketplace's
inclination and power.").
153 Although established environmental organizations have repeatedly been attacked
by SLAPPs, see PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 85 (identifying the Sierra Club as "the
nation's leading SLAPP target"), others have stated that:
It should be understood that "[t]he target of [SLAPPs] are generally not radical
environmentalists, nor professional activists: they are ordinary middle-class citizens
who are concerned about their local environment and have no history of political
activity. This concentration on middle-class citizens is no accident. They often have
the most to lose, and don't have the support and ideological commitment that a
professional environmentalist in a large environmental organization usually has."
Avi Brisman, Crime-Environment Relationships and Environmental Justice, 6 SEATTLE J.
SOC. JUST. 727, 809 (2008) (quoting SHARON BEDER, GLOBAL SPIN: THE CORPORATE
ASSAULT ON ENVIRONMENTALIsm 66-67 (2002)); see also PRING & CANAN, supra note 2,
at 85 (stating that the Sierra Club is "a very atypical [SLAPP target]" because, unlike "the
local environmentalists and small groups usually targeted," it is "a real Goliath").
154 Land use and development disputes are the most common source of SLAPP
litigation. Payne, supra note 147, at 561 (discussing George N. Pring & Penelope A.
Canan, SLAPPs. An Overview of the Practice, C935 ALI-ABA 1, 10 (1994)); see also
Alves v. Hometown Newspapers, Inc., 857 A.2d 743, 752 n.16 (R.I. 2004); P. Caleb
Patterson, Have I been SLAPPed? Arkansas's Attempt to Curb Abusive Litigation: The
Citizen Participation in Government Act, 60 ARK. L. REV. 507, 528-29 (discussing
development disputes as a source of SLAPP litigation and identifying "eco-SLAPPs").
155 See Payne, supra note 147, at 562 ("If the anti-SLAPP law works properly, it
will protect the participative process on which conservation commissions rely.").
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Moreover, situations in which governmental entities have requested the
opinion or guidance of experts have been further distinguished from those
which do not involve such solicitation. Massachusetts courts have addressed
this situation in both judicial and executive agency contexts. In 2005, the
state's supreme court addressed the applicability of the Massachusetts anti-
SLAPP law to civil litigation arising from statements made in an expert's
affidavit.' 56 The Massachusetts Board of Registration in Medicine brought a
disciplinary action against a psychiatrist and sought the assistance of a
second psychiatrist-a certified addiction psychiatry specialist and Director
of Addiction Services at Massachusetts General Hospital-to assist in the
Board's examination of the complaints.'15 7 After being exonerated, the former
brought suit against the latter on theories of expert witness
malpractice/negligence, defamation, malicious prosecution, and interference
with contractual relations.' 58 The case was dismissed pursuant to the anti-
SLAPP statute, but was reversed on appeal.' 59 The supreme court held that
the anti-SLAPP measure was inapplicable because, in its view, "the statute is
designed to protect overtures to the government by parties petitioning in their
status as citizens. It is not intended to apply to those performing services for
the government as contractors." 160 In reaching its conclusion, the court relied
on the statutory language referring to the "right of petition under the
constitution," suggesting that this constitutional reference evidenced the
legislature's intent to extend anti-SLAPP immunity only where the
petitioning activity at issue was undertaken to support the moving party's
own interests.' 61 The dissent, criticizing the majority's reliance on purported
legislative intent, articulated the public policy favoring immunity and
reinforcing the value of making explicit the protection of witnesses:
There is nothing absurd or unreasonable about protecting all witnesses from
lawsuits based on the statements they give during the course of agency
proceedings. To the contrary, absolute immunity from suit has long been
accorded to witnesses in judicial proceedings, even if their testimony is
knowingly false. The privilege is grounded in the view that it is more
important that witnesses be free from fear of civil liability for what they say
than that a person who has been defamed by their testimony have a remedy.
Massachusetts law recognizing such absolute immunity accords with well-
established law across the country. This immunity is accorded not merely
for statements made as part of a witness's testimony at trial, but for
156 Kobrin v. Gastfriend, 821 N.E.2d 60, 61 (Mass. 2005).
157 Id. at 61-62.
15 8 Id at 62.
19I.at 63.
16 0 Id. at 64.
16 1'Id. at 66.
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statements made in the context of a proposed judicial proceeding. This
absolute privilege applies not only to oral testimony in court, but also to
statements or testimony given in written form. 162
This policy supporting the protection of witnesses, in conjunction with
the established recognition of experts as essential to effective judicial and
administrative processes, supports the availability of anti-SLAPP protections
to expert witnesses-if not all witnesses. In order to avoid the chilling effect
associated with SLAPPs, and ensure experts' willingness to participate in
goverrnental processes, there must be substantial certainty in the law.'163
The Massachusetts Supreme Court has also addressed the applicability of
the anti-SLAPP law to expert opinion submitted to an executive agency. In
Baker v. Parsons,164 the Massachusetts Supreme Court addressed a case in
which a permit applicant brought suit against a scientist who had, at an
executive agency's request, provided her opinion on the proposed
construction's ecological impact. 165 The United States Army Corps of
Engineers, the permitting body, had requested comment from the
Massachusetts Division of Fisheries regarding the construction of a pier on
an island. 166 The Division, in developing its comments, asked Katherine
Parsons, a biologist who had conducted environmental research on the island,
to provide an opinion. In response, Parsons submitted a written statement
explaining that the proposed site provided important wildlife habitat and was
162 Kobrn, 821 N.E.2d at 73 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
163 The Kobrin dissent noted that the majority's holding raised more questions than
it answered, and created substantial uncertainty with respect to the scope of the
Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute:
Today's decision casts a pall of uncertainty over the status of many persons who
make statements to the government. What if an expert is hired by a petitioner-will
the petitioner's "own interests" in the matter allow us to extend the protections of
§ 59H to the petitioner's disinterested expert, or does the fact that the individual
expert has no "grievance of his own," deprive the expert of those protections? What
about lobbyists or lawyers? They are customarily making statements to government
officials on behalf of their clients, not on their own behalf and are compensated for
doing so. Is their connection to the proceeding also a "mere contractual connection"
that deprives them of protection? What about persons who testify' before agencies
after being subpoenaed (by either the agency or by any of the parties)-such persons
submit "statement[s]" in connection with the agency proceeding, but if they did not
want to make statements of their own volition, are they pursuing their "own"~
grievances, or exercising their "right of petition under the constitution"?
Kobrin, 821 N.E.2d at 76-77 (Sosman, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
164 750 N.E.2d 953, 955 (Mass. 2001).




therefore an improper location for the pier.167 The property owner (Baker)
who had requested the permit then brought suit against Parsons, alleging that
her statement had caused citizens to pressure the Executive Office of
Environmental Affairs to conduct an environmental impact review of the
proposed construction. 16 8 Baker asserted that Parsons's statement amounted
to intentional infliction of emotional distress, libel, slander, and civil rights
violation, and resulted in damages including legal fees, lost income, and
physical harm. 16 9
Parsons is representative of a class of individuals whose contribution of
expertise to government processes supports statutorily mandated protection,
and this class is not alone in warranting this express protection. The media]'70
and the medical community,' 7 ' asserting 'similar rationales, have noted the
particular risks posed by SLAPPs to certain members of their respective
professions. Although statutorily outlining specific protections for these
groups and others represents a challenge with respect to the policy decisions
legislatures would have to make, these provisions would fuirther the purposes
of anti-SLAPP legislation.
D. Appealability
As with other characteristics, state anti-SLAPP laws vary with respect to
appealability. Litigants' right to interlocutory appeal of anti-SLAPP motion
decisions has been acknowledged in state courts in California,' 72 Georgia, 173
Maine, 174 Massachusetts,17 5 New Mexico,' 76 and Pennsylvania,177 and
168 Id at 956.
169 Id. at 957 n.8. For additional discussion of Baker, see Rebecca Ariel Hoffberg,
Note, The Special Mortion Requirements of the Massachusetts Anti-SLAPP Statute. A
Real Slap in the Face for Traditional Civil Practice and Procedure, 16 B.U. PUB. INT.
L.J. 97, 107-10 (2006).
170 See Soc'y of Prof 1 Journalists & Baker and Hostetler LLP, A Uniform Act
Limiting Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation, SOCY OF PROF'L
JOURNALISTS, http://www.spj.org/antislapp.asp (last visited Mar. 15, 2010). See generally
Hartzler, supra note 136, at 1235; Wright-Pegs, supra note 136, at 323.
171 See AM. Med. Assoc. House of Delegates, Report Of
Reference Committee K, Am. MED. Assoc., http://Avww.ama-
assn.org/meetings/Public/interirno5/refcomkannotateda05.doc (last visited Mar. 15,
2010).
172 See Platypus Wear, Inc. v. Goldberg, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 95, 98 (Cal. Ct. App.
2008).
17 See Harkins v. Atlanta Humane Soc'y, 590 S.E.2d 737 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).
17 See Schelling v. Lindell, 942 A.2d 1226, 1229-30 (Me. 2008).
175 See Fabre v. Walton, 781 N.E.2d 780, 784 (Mass. 2002).
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federal courts have allowed immediate appeal of holdings under the anti-
SLAPP statutes of California, 178 Louisiana,' 79 and Georgia.' 80 Maine's
supreme court noted the consistency between the purposes of the anti-SLAPP
and interlocutory appeal procedures, emphasizing that the court "allow[s]
interlocutory appeals from denials of special motions to dismiss brought
pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute because a failure to grant review .. . at
this stage would impose additional litigation costs on defendants, the very
harm the statute seeks to avoid, and would result in a loss of defendants'
substantial rights."'18'
Federal courts rely on the collateral order doctrine set forth in Cohen v.
Beneficial Industrial Loan Corporation'18 2 to identify circumstances in which
interlocutory appeals should be granted, and many states have adopted a
comparable analytical approach.' 83 Under the collateral order doctrine, an
order is immediately appealable if it "conclusively determine[s] the disputed
question, resolve[s] an important issue completely separate from the merits
of the action, and [is] effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final
judgment."' 84 These criteria distinguish cases in which an anti-SLAPP
motion is granted, and those in which such a motion is denied. As noted,
SLAPPs differ from other types of litigation because victory and defeat lie
not in final judgment, but in the ability of one party to entangle the other in
burdensome, frivolous litigation. The Pring and Canan model provides that
"the moving party shall have a right to expedited appeal from a trial court
order denying such a motion or from a trial court failure to rule on such a
'76 NwMexico's anti-SLAPP statute states that "[a]ny party shall have the right to
an expedited appeal from a trial court order on the special motions described in
Subsection B." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-2-9. 1(C) (20 10).
177 See Penllyn Greene Assocs., L.P. v. Clouser, 890 A.2d 424, 427 n.1 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2005) (noting that Pennsylvania's anti-SLAPP statute provides for
interlocutory appeal of right).
178 See Zamani v. Garnes, 491 F.3d 990, 994 (9th Cir. 2007).
17 See Henry v. Lake Charles Am. Press, L.L.C., 566 F.3d 164, 183 (5th Cir. 2009).
180 See Adventure Outdoors, Inc. v. Bloomberg, 552 F.3d 1290 (11Ith Cir. 2008).
181 Schelling v. Lindell, 942 A.2d 1226, 1229-30 (Me. 2008).
182 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
183 Some jurisdictions recognize a doctrine substantially similar to the collateral
order doctrine but assign it a different title. Massachusetts, for instance, relies on a "rule
of present execution," which the state's supreme court has identified as "closely
analogous" to the collateral order doctrine. Borman v. Borman, 393 N.E.2d 847, 852
(Mass. 1979); see also Ruggiero v. Giamarco, 901 N.E.2d 1233, 1239 n.7 (Mass. App.
Ct. 2009) ("When a motion to dismiss under the anti-SLAPP statute is denied, invocation
of the doctrine of present execution to permit immediate appellate review preserves the
statutorily granted right to immunity.").




motion in expedited fashion."'185 Provision for immediate appeal is consistent
with both the objectives of the collateral order doctrine and anti-SLAPP
laws, and supports the certainty which is essential to the statutes' effective
operation.
111. CONCLUSION
While the SLAPP phenomenon has provoked widely varying reactions
from legislatures, courts, scholars, and the public, the resulting statutes,
judicial doctrines, and other procedural remedies share the prerequisite that,
in order to achieve their objectives, the public have a high degree of certainty
with respect to their protection. The immunity that these measures purport to
provide is meaningless if those who would benefit from the statutes are
nonetheless silenced because they cannot rely on protections which may or
may not be available when they are improperly brought into court. In these
circumstances, concrete statutory language is necessary to both reassure and
protect those individuals and groups who are vulnerable to ambush by
abusive litigation.
185 PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 203.
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